A growing body of literature highlights moral reasons for embracing global democracy. This literature justifies democracy on the grounds of its intrinsic value. But democracy also has instrumental value: the rule of the many is epistemically superior to the rule of one or the rule of the few. I draw on the tradition of epistemic democracy to develop an instrumentalist justification for democratizing global governance. I develop an epistemic-democratic framework for evaluating political institutions-one composed of three principles. The likelihood of making correct decisions within institutions of global governance increases when those institutions maximize (1) human development and capacity for participation; (2) their internal cognitive diversity; and (3) public opportunities for sharing objective and subjective knowledge. Applying this framework to global governance produces a better understanding of the nature and extent of its "democratic deficit," as well as the actions required to address this deficit.
Introduction
Global governance suffers from a democratic deficit. In protests and activism surrounding the WTO, G8, and UN climate negotiations, participants decry the despotism of powerful, exclusive, and opaque international institutions. Civil society's demands for inclusion may not always take the form of explicit demands for democracy, but they couch them in democratic values-such as transparency, representation, participation, accountability, and citizenship.
These demands resonate with-and often animatescholarly considerations of global democratization. International Relations scholars have traditionally given little thought to democracy. As Archibugi and Held (2011, 433) observe, most International Relations textbooks prior to 1989 do not even contain the word "democracy." For many years, International Relations scholars cared about democracy largely in the context of democratization in weak or failing states, or when investigating how domestic regime type affects foreign policy. Similarly, democratic theorists traditionally focused on the nationstate. But global institutions increasingly exercise decision-making authority. This creates challenges for democracy and, for many, an imperative to extend democratic values beyond the nation-state. The challenges and opportunities for democratic rule at the global level are now acknowledged in almost all recent handbooks on both democracy and international relations (Archibugi and Held 2011, 433-44) . 1 The growing literature on global democratic theory analyzes how globalization affects the theory and practice of democracy (Bray and Slaughter 2015) . It brings various normative lenses to bear on this question, including liberal, republican, cosmopolitan, deliberative, and radical democratic traditions. While precise conceptualizations of democracy vary, participants in these debates share an understanding of democracy as, in broad terms, referring to "the various overlapping ways in which citizens interact and influence public decision-making processes" (Archibugi and Held 2011, 4) . Scholars who examine the democratic deficit of global governance prescribe various remedies, including global parliaments (Falk and Strauss 2000) , cosmopolitan institutions (Held 1995) , deliberative systems (Dryzek 2009; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014) , stakeholder democracy (Macdonald 2008; B€ ackstrand 2006) , democratic global constitutionalism (Peters 2009 ), global forums of social movements (Smith et al. 2016) , and gender-sensitive reforms or transformations (Eschle 2002) .
In the main, moral concerns for democratizing global rule animate this scholarship. It assumes that democracy has intrinsic value because its procedures are fair and just: people are morally entitled to contribute to collective decisions that affect them, and democracy respects this entitlement. Without wishing to subordinate the intrinsic value of democracy, in this paper I argue that democracy also has instrumental value. This shifts attention away from the fairness of democracy to its consequences. Democracy is more inclusive than other forms of decision-making, and it is more effective at tapping into diverse perspectives. As I will argue, inclusive and diverse decisionmaking procedures are likely to produce better outcomes than those that are exclusive and homogeneous. Justifications for expanding participation in decisionmaking in global institutions would prove considerably stronger if they paid more attention to instrumentalist justifications. 2 Contemporary epistemic democrats generally present their arguments as augmenting, rather than challenging, alternative theories of democracy.
3 Deliberative democrats concern themselves with the legitimacy of democratic authority; epistemic democrats generally focus on its instrumentalist justification. 4 A deliberative conception of legitimacy roots itself in "the resonance of collective decisions with public opinion, defined in terms of the provisional engagement and contestation of discourses in the public sphere as transmitted to public authority in empowered space" (Dryzek 2010, 40-41) . Unlike epistemic democrats, deliberative democrats usually shy away from attributing an epistemic value to processes of engagement. For deliberative democrats, decisions should resonate with reflected public opinion because this constitutes legitimate procedure-not because it approximates the truth.
5 I draw on insights of epistemic-democratic theory to defend the instrumental value of inclusivity and diversity in global governance. Following Dryzek (2009) , I treat global democracy as a process of democratization. This allows us to consider potential piecemeal reforms to existing processes and institutions to improve their democratic quality, rather than aim to replace the existing system. This article proceeds in four sections. Following this introduction, I trace the tradition of epistemic democracy back to its ancient roots to identify its core assumptions. I then focus on three prominent questions in contemporary debates about epistemic democracy. First, are "the people" sufficiently competent to entrust with decisionmaking? Second, must decision-makers maintain cognitive independence to reach the correct decision? Third, is the pursuit of "truth" appropriate in politics? I outline the competing perspectives and clarify my own position. I then make a case for extending epistemic democracy to the global level, and construct an epistemic-democratic framework for evaluating global governance. This framework rests on maximizing three principles: (1) human development and capacity for participation; (2) the internal cognitive diversity of global institutions; and (3) public opportunities for sharing objective and subjective knowledge. My examination reveals shortcomings but also possibilities for improvement. I conclude the paper by identifying next steps for a research agenda on global epistemic democratization.
Foundations of Epistemic Democracy
The philosophical foundations of epistemic democracy trace back at least as far as Aristotle, who introduced the idea that "more heads are better than one" in chapter 11 of Politics (350 BC):
For the many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively . . . . For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand the whole (cited in Waldron [1995] , 564)
He further elaborated on the doctrine of the "wisdom of the multitude" (Waldron 1995) in chapter 15:
Taken individually, any one of these people [members of the assembly] is perhaps inferior to the best person. But a city-state consists of many people, just like a feast to which many contribute, and is better than one that is a unity and simple. That is why a crowd can also judge many things better than any single individual. (quoted in Landemore 2013, 61) Later, in the eighteenth century, the French mathematician and philosopher the Marquis de Condorcet added statistical support to Aristotle's philosophical logic. Concerned with reforming the French system of justice by developing epistemically defensible processes of jurist election and decision-making, Condorcet formulated the hypothesis now known as Condorcet Jury Theorem (Williams 2007, 187-90) . List and Goodin (2001, 283) explain this theorem thus: (i)f each member of a jury is more likely to be right than wrong, then the majority of the jury, too, is more likely to be right than wrong; and the probability that the right outcome is supported by a majority of the jury is a (swiftly) increasing function of the size of the jury, converging to 1 as the size of the jury tends to infinity. This law of large numbers rests on conditions of voter independence, competence, and sincerity, and it ultimately reaches the conclusion that "larger groups make better decisions, and very large groups are infallible" (Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013, 88) . The condition of independence requires that voters form preferences and cast votes truthfully and free from others' influence. The condition of competence requires that each voter has at least a marginally greater than 50% chance of being correct (Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013, 91-92) . Widespread ignorance would undermine the potential for epistemic democracy. This concerned Condorcet (1976, 49) , who feared that increasing the number of people in an assembly would increase the levels of ignorance: "(a) very numerous assembly cannot be composed of very enlightened men. It is even probable that those comprising this assembly will on many matters combine great ignorance with many prejudices. Thus there will be a great number of questions on which the 2 On the intrinsic-instrumentalist distinction in democratic theory, see Christiano (2003, 3-16) . 3 Instrumentalist justifications for democracy appear in epistemic theories of democracy extending back to Aristotle. In fact, the tradition of epistemic democracy is enjoying a renaissance within political theory and popular nonfiction. Scott Page's The Difference, James Surowieski's The Wisdom of Crowds, and Cass Sunstein's Infotopia all advance the Aristotelian adage that "more heads are better than one." Landemore and Elster (2012) lead this scholarly revival. They extoll the virtues of "collective intelligence" in public life. 4 Some epistemic democrats aim to address moral and instrumentalist justifications for democratic authority (for example, Estlund [2008] ). Others bracket the question of legitimacy to focus on the epistemic attributes of deliberation and democracy. I follow this latter, more modest, approach. 5 Notable exceptions are green political theorists who often gravitate toward deliberative democracy because it is most likely to produce good environmental outcomes (for example, Baber and Bartlett [2005] ).
probability of the truth of each voter will be below 1 = 2 ." But, when voters are independent, truthful, voting on the same topic, and more than likely to be right than wrong, then the probability of a correct decision increases toward 100% as the number of voters increases (Goodin 2008, 80-86) . In this way, collective decisions will produce a more truthful outcome than an individual, however competent, can produce alone. While originally theorized for situations in which voters had a choice between two alternatives, List and Goodin (2001, 279) show that Condorcet Jury Theorem theoretically holds where there are multiple alternatives. The condition of sincerity requires that those involved in decision-making truthfully register a vote or judgment that they believe will benefit the common good. A sincere vote or judgment is therefore distinct from a purely self-interested or strategic vote (Landemore 2013, 154) . Contrary to rational choice theory, studies of voting psychology and practice show that "pocketbook voting" is not the norm. Voters usually distinguish between personal and governmental problems; they usually consider the big picture rather than their own predicament; and they do not usually reason purely on the basis of their own socioeconomic position (Popkin 1991, 31-34) .
Condorcet Jury Theorem traditionally relies on voting to extract epistemic value from large numbers of people. But as Goodin (2008, 81) observes, voting is not a necessary feature of the theorem; it equally holds if we replace voting with judgment: "so long as each informant brings independent judgment to bear on the same subject, and individuals' judgments are on average more likely to be correct than in error, then the most common judgment among a large number of individuals is almost certain to be the correct judgment." Writing in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill elaborated an epistemic account of collective decisionmaking based on deliberation instead of voting. Mill (1861, 45-46) rejected the assumed superiority of a "good despot" model of government, arguing that to be effective and virtuous the despot would not only have to be good but also all-seeing: so informed, insightful, and observant as to be "superhuman." Instead, the best form of government would be one in which "sovereignty . . . is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice . . . but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government" (Mill 1861, 53 ). Mill's (1861, 73-74) vision of representative parliament was that of a "Congress of Opinions": an arena in which not only the general opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and, as far as possible, of every eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and challenge discussion; where every person . . . may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than he could speak it himself-not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy.
Parliament, in Mill's vision, was a place for talking, but not a place for doing. This leads contemporary scholars to describe Mill as an epistemic liberal but not an epistemic democrat (Schwartzberg 2015, 194-95) . Discussion ought to feed into decisions, but ultimately the "conduct of public business" was a task for those high public officials "specially trained" to do it (Mill 1861, 105-6) . The Congress of Opinions should be limited to debate, critique, and suggestions.
Key Debates in Epistemic Democratic Theory
Historical and contemporary scholarship lack a single theory of epistemic democracy. In contemporary scholarship, debate focuses on three key questions: (1) are "the people" sufficiently competent to entrust with decision-making? (2) must decision-makers maintain cognitive independence to reach the correct decision? and (3) is the pursuit of "truth" appropriate in politics? 6 In their efforts to advance logically and empirically robust accounts of epistemic democracy, contemporary scholars provide different responses to these questions (List and Goodin 2001; Peter 2009; Landemore 2012a Landemore , 2013 Landemore and Elster 2012) .
Are " the People" Sufficiently Competent?
Political philosophy has had an elitist, anti-democratic streak at least since Plato's time. It is "a widely held contention . . . that the average man is incapable of partaking in a system of self-government because of his invariable confusion and misdirection over what is actually best for himself or essential to his wellbeing" (Meyer 1974, 200) . Early epistemic democrats generally shared this suspicion. While retaining faith in the superiority of "rule by the many" over "rule by the few," Condorcet, Mill, and others were wary of entrusting the public with public decisionmaking responsibilities.
Exclusion on grounds of ignorance is built into Condorcet's theorem. He considered it a "dangerous" proposition to "give a democratic constitution to an unenlightened people" (quoted in Landemore 2013, 150-51) . But Condorcet criticized structural inequality and defended human rights and the emancipation of women and slaves. His faith in enlightenment was not reserved for a few brilliant men. Instead, Condorcet assumed that public education could lead to mass enlightenment (Lukes and Urbinati 2012, xxi-xxii) . Mill also favored giving extra votes to well-educated people. Like Condorcet, Mill reasoned that their superior wisdom justified a higher level of political influence. While he advocated the involvement of all people in deliberation, he wished to avoid the epistemic failures that might result from the educated being outnumbered by the uneducated (Estlund 2008, 206-22 ). Mill's intention was not to consolidate a situation of inequality but rather to promote the importance of publicly funded education and civic participation (Mackie 2012, 298) .
Contemporary epistemic democrats generally distance themselves from their forerunners' mistrust in the masses. One contemporary position holds that ignorance does not disrupt the law of large numbers. Landemore's (2013, 50) theorem of "diversity trumps ability" is characteristic of this position. She acknowledges the pervasiveness of public ignorance, 7 but argues that the significance of individual ignorance diminishes when people are drawn into a group. Under the right conditions, she argues, the group itself can outsmart any individual within that group. People as a collective are competent when they lack competence as individuals. In the following section, I explain the conditions under which this would hold. Another contemporary position emphasizes the importance of public education, but also values people's lived experiences. This avoids the 6 These are not the only points of debate, but on my reading of the literature these questions are the most contentious and hence the most appropriate to address within the limited scope of this article. 7 Various studies in the United States reveal high levels of ignorance about domestic and foreign political systems and current affairs (Landemore 2013, 36) .
disenfranchisement that Condorcet and Mill advocate, while recognizing the merit in enhancing competence. John Dewey (1916, 1-10) held such a position and drew a distinction between the formal education of schooling and the informal education of experience and socialization. Balancing the two was essential for social advancement. My position in this debate draws on insights from early and contemporary epistemic theorists. Enhancing people's competence to contribute to deliberation and decisionmaking about public affairs requires addressing pervasive ignorance and the deprivation of basic needs that inhibit participation. There may be strong moral justifications for minimizing inequalities (Dingwerth 2014) , but the jury is out on whether there are strong instrumental reasons for doing so.
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What is clear is that there are strong instrumental reasons for meeting a minimum threshold of basic needs. 9 Condorcet's theorem rests on the assumption that "(t)he degree of rightness would vary in accordance with the degree of enlightenment and the size of the majority" (Williams 2007, 190) . The more competent people involved, the better the outcome. Increasing the degree of rightness requires addressing the conditions that suppress competence or enlightenment. One promising way to think about competence is the capabilities approach. Nussbaum's (2011, 20-21) concept of "central capabilities" encompasses attributes of physical well-being as well as traits and abilities that are learned or developed. The substance of essential capabilities is a matter best determined through epistemic democratic procedures. Provisionally, though, four of Nussbaum's (2011, 33-34) central capabilities have particular epistemic relevance:
1. Life: "Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living;" 2. Bodily health: "Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter;" 3. Senses, imagination, and thought: "Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason . . . including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression . . . "; 4. Practical reason: "Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life . . ."
Such a capabilities approach defines a human development agenda that now informs international welfare agencies and governments alike (Nussbaum 2011, x) .
Is Cognitive Independence Necessary?
In its original formulation, Condorcet's Jury Theorem relies on the ambitious condition of cognitive independence: it requires that people do not communicate when forming and registering a view. In his recent popular account of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, Surowiecki (2005, 41) defends the importance of independence on two grounds: "(f)irst, it keep(s) the mistakes people make from becoming correlated. Errors in individual judgment won't wreck the group's collective judgment as long as those errors are systematically pointing in the same direction . . . Second, independent individuals are more likely to have new information rather than the same old data everyone else is familiar with." Sunstein (2006, 28) notes that this assumption might hold among punters at a funfair estimating the weight of an animal, but for any issue of public concern individuals do communicate, and their perspectives and preferences are shaped by various common factors (the media; conversations with friends; political rhetoric; etc.). This is also true of experts who draw on the same publicly available evidence. Economists called on to estimate the probability of a recession are likely to interpret the same evidence with the same theoretical models that they were taught. They are therefore influenced in the same way and not cognitively independent. A large group of these economists is just as likely to miss a pending crash as a small group (Dietrich and Spiekermann 2013, 94 ). Landemore's account of epistemic democracy replaces an emphasis on cognitive independence with an emphasis on cognitive diversity. Indeed, the Condorcetian condition of cognitive independence is implicitly based on an assumption that individuals have access to diverse information, which would be tainted by consultation with others. For Landemore, the value of collective decisionmaking rests on the concept of "collective intelligence," which combines two factors. "One factor is the ability of sophistication of the individual members of the group, which can be expressed as an average ability. . . The other factor is 'cognitive diversity' or, roughly, the existence within a given group of different ways to see the world, interpret it, and apply predictive models in it" (Landemore 2012b, 3) . The rule of the many is thus inherently superior to the rule of the one or of the few, because these systems lack cognitive diversity. Landemore's (2013, 104) solution for maximizing cognitive diversity is simply to increase numbers: "the advantage of involving large numbers is that it automatically ensures greater cognitive diversity." She suggests that it is simply more plausible to assume that cognitive diversity increases as numbers increase than it is to assume that cognitive diversity increases as numbers decrease.
The shift from cognitive independence to cognitive diversity is a convincing development in epistemic democratic theory. However, we cannot assume that increasing numbers would increase diversity. A randomly selected jury may contain fairly homogeneous individuals, with perspectives shaped by similar experiences or media. Irrespective of its size, a committee or decision-making body selected on merit may also be fairly homogeneous. Insofar as merit is interpreted narrowly, there is a danger of squeezing out diversity by homogenizing competence. Maximizing the likelihood of a group making the "right" decision requires mitigating this homogeneity. An additional intervention for maximizing diversity is to deliberately ensure that various life experiences and social positions are represented within decision-making bodies. Ober (2012, 119-22) argues that Athens was able to outperform its city-state rivals partly because its participatory democracy harnessed diversity to better confront challenges. The Athenian Council of 500 was responsible for governance tasks ranging from agenda setting to policy implementation, and was constituted by socially and geographically diverse decision-makers. Mechanisms such as 8 Landemore (2014a) has recently suggested that egalitarian inclusiveness is best suited to decision-making in complex and uncertain conditions. 9 Given that meeting such a threshold is a necessary condition for minimizing inequalities, I will bracket the concern with inequalities.
"lottery, rotation, and representative sampling" ensured this diversity (Ober 2012, 122) .
Is the Pursuit of Truth Appropriate in Politics?
So far I have bracketed the question of what constitutes a right or correct decision. Epistemic democrats differ on whether they conceptualize correctness in veritistic or non-veritistic terms. Original formulations of Condorcet Jury Theorem understood correctness as objectively verifiable truth. On the basis of this procedure-independent standard of correctness, an outcome can be assessed as right or wrong without reference to the process by which it was decided. For many epistemic theorists, this veritistic conception of correctness is a defining feature of epistemic democracy (Landemore 2013, 208-30) .
Whether claims of truth have any place in democracy is highly contested. Hannah Arendt forcefully argued that claims to truth preclude debate, which is "the very essence of political life" (quoted in Villa [2000] , 255). Indeed, the nature of "truth" remains a contentious point among scholars who are sympathetic to the principles and aims of epistemic democracy. Peter (2009, 113-14) , for example, is wary of "the potentially anti-democratic implications of emphasizing correctness." This potential is revealed in Ober's (2012, 123-24) suggestion that democracy requires an "epistemic sorting device" for "distinguishing . . . truth from falsity (and) . . . weeding out false or irrelevant information." For him, "social knowledge" and routinization perform this sorting function by providing citizens and decision-makers with a shared context for trusting certain individuals and knowledge claims over others.
Critics argue that the veritistic account of correctness leaves little room for diverse values and judgments, and assumes that those who oppose a decision have simply made an error (Schwartzberg 2015, 199-200; Peter 2009, 113-14) . Estlund (2008, 98-116) resolves this problem with a defense of democracy that rests on "epistemic proceduralism." He argues that even if democratic decisions are not always right, they are legitimate because democracy is a procedure that tends to get things right. This argument doesn't appease critics because it still maintains a commitment to a veritistic conceptualization of correctness. Scholars inspired by Dewey argue that the epistemic value of democracy can be obtained without holding to a veritistic understanding of correctness (Anderson 2006, 13-17; Peter 2009, 121-36) . Understanding "correctness" as an attribute generated by democratic processes is expected to dissolve any despotic and technocratic tensions in epistemic democracy. In Dewey's experimentalist model of epistemic democracy, decision-making takes the form of "cooperative social experimentation" (Anderson 2006, 13) . This involves diverse citizens determining issues of public concern and possible solutions through inclusive discussion before testing out actual decisions. Anderson (2006, 13) explains that "failures to solve the problem . . . or solving the problem but at the cost of generating worse problemsshould be treated in a scientific spirit as disconfirmation of our policies." This replaces a veritistic epistemology with a pragmatist one whereby the "right" decisions are those that experience shows to improve human well-being (Peter 2009, 117-19) . Inclusive and diverse participation thereby becomes essential for good decision-making.
Dewey's experimentalist account of democracy is attractive. But, contrary to its aims, we cannot separate it from a veritistic account of truth. We can only determine whether an experiment succeeded if we have some independent conception of correctness. While we need to recognize the anti-political potential of veritistic accounts of correctness, dismissing the possibility of independent truth is neither necessary nor desirable. In practice, policymakers, political analysts, and ordinary people tend to judge decisions in hindsight as right or wrong. They make these judgments on the basis of (a) whether they resolved a situation, and/or (b) whether they created further problems. This implies that some decisions are indeed wrong, and that a right decision existed whether or not it was discovered at the time.
Positioning myself within these debates, I argue that we can assume the existence of a procedure-independent standard of correctness. In any situation, there is a correct decision. This is the one that most effectively resolves a problem with the fewest unintended negative consequences. While the rightfulness of any given decision is not an attribute generated by any particular procedure, the likelihood of reaching the correct decision is procedure-dependent. The procedure most likely to reach a correct decision is one that maximizes inclusivity, diversity, and competence. The greater the numbers, diversity, and competence of those included, the greater the likelihood of discarding bad ideas and identifying good ones.
This position distances us from Ober's epistemic "sorting device," which risks becoming a tool of domination and exclusion. Assuming that a procedureindependent standard of correctness exists does not require treating all knowledge claims as either true or false. In some circumstances, this would be appropriate (for example, on matters where there is a high degree of scientific consensus). But in many circumstances, it is inappropriate and exclusionary. Decision-making on most issues of public concern will implicate elements of objective truth and falsity, as well as elements of subjective judgment. Rather than resort to epistemic sorting devices, we can trust humans' capacity for reflecting on a diverse range of subjective positions.
Returning to Aristotle's words above (3), we can appreciate his expectation that people would bring more than simply verifiable information to the decision-making table; they would bring practical wisdom. Waldron (1995, 569-70) interprets this as knowledge, experience, judgment, and insight. Pooling practical wisdom would likely produce the best decisions concerning both factual and ethical matters of policy and strategy. He cautioned against understanding this as simply a matter of aggregating individual knowledge; instead, the process is more "synthetic or even dialectical." Waldron (1995, 569-70) explained: "(Aristotle's) view is that deliberation among the many is a way of bringing each citizen's ethical views and insights . . . to bear on the views and insights of each of the others, so that they cast light on each other, providing a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism, and enabling a position to emerge which is better than any of the inputs and much more than an aggregation or function of those inputs."
Epistemic Democracy and Global Governance
Epistemic democracy is applicable to different systems of rule, from the Athenian city-state to the modern nationstate. In this section, I argue that epistemic democracy also applies to rule-making beyond the nation-state. Scholars often characterize systems of rule at this level in terms of "global governance," which refers to the multiple structures and processes that shape collective responses to collective problems and create a sense of order within an anarchical international system. Global governance encompasses the "formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens, and organizations-both intergovernmental and nongovernmental-through which collective interests are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated" (Thakur and Langenhove 2006, 233) . Global governance includes formal and familiar institutions like the United Nations and World Bank, but also informal and less familiar institutions like Avaaz and the Verified Carbon Standard.
Whereas traditional studies of international relations focus on the state as the central authority in the international system, global governance scholars recognize that centers of authority and power are diverse and diffuse. Global governance has many global governors (Avant et al. 2010, 1-31) . Studying global governance involves identifying and analyzing the governors within and beyond intergovernmental institutions. Within intergovernmental institutions, decision-making power can lie with member-states themselves, but also with the executive leadership and international bureaucracies delegated to carry out institutional mandates. Beyond intergovernmental institutions, decision-making power can lie with private actors who establish institutions in response to particular global issues. Consider, for example, the considerable power that the Gates Foundation exerts on global health governance.
The epistemic democratization of global governance could not occur in a predefined and logical sequence of steps. Efforts to infuse global governance with epistemicdemocratic qualities will only ever be piecemeal. Processes of decision-making vary across international institutions with some emphasizing negotiation and bargaining, others deliberation and consensus, and others equal or weighted voting. The quality of each of these processes could be enhanced by maximizing inclusivity, diversity, and competence.
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Before elaborating on principles for the epistemic democratization of global governance, it is worth addressing two plausible counterarguments. The skeptical reader may question whether my theoretical assumptions can be reconciled with the realities of world politics. I see two major concerns.
First, epistemic democracy is an exercise in depoliticization or domination: aspiring to solve problems through inclusion and diversity requires ignoring the pervasiveness of real political conflict in the international system. In the real world, actors disagree on the very nature of problems as well as desired outcomes. Implying that there is a "right" solution denies this difference and allows only one version of the "truth." I offer two responses. Political theorists concerned about deep disagreement generally point to its cultural provenance (MacIntyre 1988) . Cultural variety may be an ontological fact in the international system, but we should not exaggerate the extent of deep differences relative to shared presuppositions (Kukathas 1994, 11) . Cosmopolitan scholars have assembled legal, philosophical, and anthropological evidence to support claims that political and cultural communities are already (and increasingly) cosmopolitan to some degree (Brown 2009; Glenn 2013) .
We should therefore treat the potential for deep moral disagreement to occasionally foreclose political debate as very real, but not pervasive. People of different traditions and moral systems have often found ways to coexist. It is possible to make good decisions in the face of difference and conflict.
11 Moreover, disagreements tend not to be so fundamental that they are insensitive to factual conditions. This is as true at the international level as it is at the national level. Here, we can usefully distinguish between "basic" and "nonbasic" value judgments: "A value judgment can be called 'basic' to a person if the judgment is supposed to apply under all conceivable circumstances, and it is 'nonbasic' otherwise" (Sen 1970, 60) . Fred may firmly believe that child labor should be prohibited but may revise this judgment if, say, he was shown evidence of a positive correlation between child labor and school enrollment. In this case, Fred's value judgment is nonbasic; it is sensitive to factual conditions. Conversely, Jane may hold that armed warfare is wrong, and under no conceivable circumstances would she revise this judgment: Jane's value judgment is basic. While there may be no neutral position from which to arbitrate between basic disagreements, pooling knowledge from diverse sources would help us reach the "right" decision when faced with nonbasic disagreements.
The precise balance between basic and nonbasic disagreements in global governance remains an open question. Contemporary theorists of epistemic democracy assume that nonbasic disagreements are more common, even in heterogeneous polities like the United States (Landemore 2014b, 202-5) . Similarly, we can proceed under the assumption that most of the disagreements that occupy the time and attention of global political institutions are of a nonbasic kind. Such conflicts are not intractable. Epistemic democracy would be valuable even if it could only work in such circumstances. But it can also accommodate basic disagreements, perhaps more so than the nation-state-because global politics lacks a supreme authority. For most global problems, no single political institution enjoys an exclusive governance mandate. Multiple public and private institutions govern most global problems (health, development, environment, etc.). If actors deeply disagree with the way an issue is problematized in one institution, they are often free to create parallel institutions. Such governance experiments are compatible with the aims of epistemic democracy.
The skeptical reader might also question whether the experience of multilateral negotiations negates any possibility of international epistemic democracy. Many negotiation analysts hold that the difficulty of reaching agreement increases with the size and diversity of the group (Hampson and Hart 1995, 28) . Others berate IR scholars' pessimism about decision-making among large numbers (Young 1994, 120-27; Buzan 1981, 341) , or question 10 Beyond the broad principles I enumerate below, it is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on options for institutional reform, not least because the institutions that constitute global governance are so diverse in their existing structures and procedures. Many IOs use voting procedures, which theoretically could be reformed to meet the demands of epistemic democracy. However, we should not reduce epistemic democracy to voting (see pp. 4-5). Communicative mechanisms already exist for pooling knowledge on a large scale without recourse to voting (for example World Bank consultation processes), or through a combination of deliberation and voting (for example the WWViews project). An emerging literature is considering the possibilities of pooling knowledge to reach collective judgments via Web 2.0 technologies (for example Breindl and Francq [2008] ).
11 Some people may be dissatisfied with decisions reached under epistemic democratic conditions, but the best decision will be reached under these conditions. The question of how we should deal with any resulting dissatisfaction takes us beyond the instrumental justification for democracy, and beyond the scope of this article.
whether small, exclusive, minilateral experiments outperform multilateral institutions (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013). Young (1994, 117-21) and Hopmann (1995, 24) suggest that scholars and practitioners have been socialized into a realist paradigm of negotiation, in which distributive bargaining over fixed payoffs is all that occurs. A problem-solving mode of "integrative bargaining" (Odell 2010, 620-21) instead entails identifying common or complementary interests and solutions. This mode of negotiation is not just a theoretical possibility; many regimes were formed in such a way (Young 1994, 117-39) .
It is certainly plausible that numbers and diversity can enrich integrative bargaining while posing challenges for distributive bargaining, but this remains uncertain. The available evidence on the impact of numbers and diversity on multilateral negotiations remains inconclusive. In exploring the impact of diversity (and other variables) on multilateral negotiations, Narlikar (2010, 264-66) and her colleagues found its effects difficult to distinguish from those of power. The precise impact of diversity remained a question for further research. When diversity was clearly isolated as a distinct cause of deadlock, it tended to affect trust among parties rather than their zone of possible agreement. Mistrust presents a significant challenge, but we can partly mitigate this through informal processes and institutional mechanisms (Narlikar 2010, 12-13, 263 ).
Studies of local-level common pool resource governance offer reason for greater optimism about the potential for large-group decision-making. Some IR scholars find the local commons a comparable context to the international system because in many cases (poor, weakly governed countries), the local level is effectively anarchical (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 1) . 12 Studies carried out and inspired by Elinor Ostrom point to successful decisionmaking among hundreds and even thousands of actors. A recurring finding is that the size of the group matters less for reaching a decision than issue-specific factors (discount rates), institutional factors (transaction costs), and communicative factors (common understanding of interests) (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 1; Ostrom 1990, 211-12) .
The impact of heterogeneity remains contested and inconclusive (Ruttan 2008, 969-70) . But it is clear that heterogeneity does not consistently or inevitably impede decision-making in large groups. Sometimes heterogeneity facilitates decision-making by presenting more positivesum options (Keohane and Ostrom 1995, 9-10) . Increasing the number and diversity of actors involved in deliberation and decision-making increases the complexity of the process, and the time it takes to reach agreement. But slow and complex processes are often the only way to effectively respond to problems (Buzan 1981, 341) . Admittedly, I present epistemic democracy as an approach for better decisions in global governance, not faster ones.
Having established that global governance is not beyond the scope of epistemic democracy, below I construct an epistemic-democratic framework for evaluating global governance. Epistemic democracy is a broad church with diverse understandings about popular competence, cognitive independence, and the nature of truth. I identified the most robust and convincing positions on each of these questions above. On that basis, I construct a framework comprising three principles. The likelihood of making correct decisions is increased if arrangements for global governance:
A) Maximize human development and capacity for participation B) Maximize internal cognitive diversity within global institutions C) Maximize public opportunities for sharing objective and subjective knowledge I apply this framework below with the aim of showing what epistemic democratization might look like at the global level. My aim is not to present a comprehensive evaluation of global governance. That would require selecting a specific domain of global governance (for example migration or finance); identifying the relevant public and private institutions; and measuring their performance on each principle. My aims are more modest. This exploratory evaluation reveals where epistemic-democratic deficits might lie, and what processes might mitigate such deficits.
A) Maximizing Human Development and Capacity for Participation
Epistemic democratic theory holds that the more competent, diverse, and numerous the decision-makers, the greater the likelihood of reaching the right decision. It is thus imperative to reduce levels of ignorance and deprivation that weaken capacity to contribute to debate and decision-making. This is a problem for the global North and South alike. Most public opinion research is limited to the North, where studies reveal widespread ignorance of social issues. For instance, citizens in the North overestimate levels of immigration and unemployment, and underestimate democratic participation (Ipsos MORI 2015) . While support for international development assistance is high among OECD countries, awareness of issues and governmental support is very shallow. Americans mistakenly assume that aid accounts for 27% of the national budget, but it is less than 1% (Romano 2011) . Awareness of international affairs is higher in Europe than in the United States. This is attributed to the fact that public broadcasters provide more international news coverage than commercial broadcasters, and these are much more prominent in Europe than in the United States (Iyengar et al. 2009, 342-43) . Access to good-quality education and exposure to accurate and diverse sources of information is needed to mitigate ignorance. But more fundamental deprivations often undermine capacity for participation. The capacity to form reflected subjective judgments is constrained by unmet basic needs that inhibit opportunities for reflection and deliberation. The record of global institutions in addressing such deprivations remains inadequate. Since the early 1990s, a human development paradigm has governed global efforts to address basic needs. This reflects a shift away from a growth-centric economic development paradigm in which GDP growth is sufficient for reducing poverty. Inspired by Sen's early work on capabilities, Mahbub ul Haq launched the UNDP Human Development Reports in 1990 (Fakuda-Parr 2011 . National reports soon followed and have now been produced in about 135 countries (UNDP n.d.). Reporting on such indicators as illiteracy, level of education, life 12 Keohane and Ostrom (1995, 1) explain: "Neither modern states nor small farmers in remote areas of poor countries can appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce rules . . . . For small farmers in Asia (for example). . . national governments are too remote or uncomprehending to be helpful in encouraging productive cooperation." expectancy, and gender inequality allows comparison of human development trends over time. Quantitative indicators have limitations, but they are a significant improvement on earlier practices of reporting exclusively on GDP. Successive reports over the past 25 years reveal that "most people in most countries have been doing steadily better in human development" (UNDP 2014, 1). But more than 2.2 billion continue to experience acute deprivation in health, education, and standard of living (UNDP 2014, 2) .
The Millennium Development Goals further institutionalized a multidimensional needs and capability-based understanding of poverty (UNGA 2000) . While some goals were reached, the living conditions of millions of people remain grim. The goal of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty was achieved, thereby improving the plight of some 700 million people globally. By 2010, 200 million people had moved from urban slums into sanitary and durable housing. Most countries met the goal of halving the percentage of chronically undernourished people, yet this still leaves some 870 million people living in hunger (UN 2013, 4) . Enrollment in primary education increased by 83% during the goal period. But the quality of education is parlous in many places and, as a result, many children remain illiterate (UN 2015) . Perhaps the clearest indication of deficit on this principle of epistemic democracy is the fact that net aid disbursements from the North to South have dropped in recent and consecutive years. Aid dropped by 2% from 2010 to 2011, and by a further 4% from 2011 to 2012 (UN 2013, 5) .
Deprivation and poverty marginalize many people from debates about international affairs. Global institutions are increasingly opening up to civil society, but as I show below (pp. 23-24), it is mainly well-resourced and professionalized NGOs from the North who are able to gain access. Ultimately, redoubling efforts to enhance human development, as well as exposure to accurate and diverse information on social issues and international affairs, is necessary to enhance capacity for participation, and thereby enhance the epistemic-democratic quality of global governance. The new Sustainable Development Goals offer reasons for optimism. Focusing on both the North and the South, the goals include targets for reducing poverty, improving education, and ensuring that "all learners acquire knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including among others through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity" (UN 2015).
B) Maximizing Internal Cognitive Diversity Within Global Institutions
At first glance, the international system is remarkably diverse: the United Nations General Assembly has 193 member-states reflecting many different languages, cultures, histories, and stages and styles of development. These states have established numerous specialized agencies and institutions to address common problems ranging from trade and terrorism to food security and financial stability. Alongside this multilateral system is a patchwork of complementary and competitive minilateral clubs, and private institutions that shape international responses to particular issues. If epistemic democracy thrives on diversity and large numbers, global governance seemingly provides ideal conditions. But this picture of diversity is unsettled by considering two cases that expose hidden homogeneity within ostensibly diverse institutions. The epistemic democratization of global governance requires identifying factors that limit diversity and obscure homogeneity. Multilateral negotiations involve a greater number of participants than perhaps any other decision-making process at the international level. But even when many states are involved in deliberations and decision-making, cognitive diversity can be diminished by hegemonic discourses. Dryzek (2009, 9) argues that a discourse of market liberalism "is accepted by most key actors in the world economic system," and has shaped multilateral debates and decisions about development, trade, and financial stability. The only source of contestation comes from outside multilateral institutions.
Empirical analysis of negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change reveals a similar picture. Stevenson and Dryzek (2014) assessed the legitimacy of climate negotiations by gauging the extent to which deliberations reflected broader public debate. These findings on discursive representation also yield valuable insights for epistemic concerns about diversity. While there is no hegemonic discourse on climate change, limited discursive diversity is reflected in negotiations (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 77-82) . Annual climate negotiations attract the participation of nearly 200 countries and up to 15,000 government delegates. These actors frequently disagree about precise targets, mechanisms, and institutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change. But their points of disagreement obscure a high degree of homogeneity in the way in which they perceive and problematize climate change. Stevenson and Dryzek (2014, 37-60) identified eight distinct climate change discourses in the "global public sphere": climate marketization; ecological modernization; equitable modernization; natural integrity; limits; ecofeminism; radical decentralization; and new globalism (see also Nasiritousi et al. [2014] ). Only the first two are well reflected in climate negotiations. Most parties assume that climate change action can be defined within the parameters of the existing liberal capitalist system; that the drive to compete and accumulate material goods and wealth is an inherent aspect of human nature and relations; that low-carbon capitalism is a viable option by decoupling pollution and profit; and that goals of economic growth and ecological sustainability are compatible given appropriate markets or regulation (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 61-85) . Some parties pair these economicreformist ideas with politically progressive ideals about North-South equality and equitable burden sharing, but they couch these concerns in narrow state-centric terms that erase many judgments found in public debates about climate change. Questions frequently raised in public debates about the viability of industrial-scale development, exponential economic growth and unconstrained population growth, and the efficacy of market-based governance mechanisms are absent in UN climate negotiations (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 79-90) .
If increasing the number of parties involved in multilateral negotiations is insufficient for maximizing diversity, how can we improve diversity? The positions advanced in negotiations develop on two fronts: at home (involving the foreign policymaking community) and at the table (involving negotiators, chairpersons, and sometimes secretariats). For example, policy elites in governmental departments for the environment, economy, and foreign policy are all involved in shaping a party's position in climate negotiations (see Stevenson [2013] ). This is one site to target diversification by seeking to maximize the life experiences and social positions that are represented. The party delegates and negotiators then tasked with crafting an international agreement present another diversification target. Governments typically grant delegates some flexibility in their mandates to account for uncertainty. This provides some scope for creativity in the negotiation process. Chairpersons in turn play a role in ensuring that no single bloc or perspective dominates the deliberations (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 71-72) . Finally, the bureaucratic staff attached to convention secretariats or international organizations like the WTO play a part in shaping how party positions and overall agreements develop (Jinnah 2010) .
We have limited knowledge of cognitive diversity at these other levels of global institutions. However, in the context of international bureaucracies, studies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offer insights into the nature, causes, and consequences of epistemic homogeneity. While sometimes dismissed by IR scholars as epiphenomenal, international bureaucracies are one necessary site for internal cognitive diversification. They affect decision-making through organizing information, rationalizing complex issues, applying specialized knowledge, facilitating negotiation, and building capacity (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 1-10) .
Epistemic homogeneity compromises the performance of each of these functions, but in the IMF a narrow meritbased recruitment strategy produces such homogeneity. Evans and Finnemore's (2001, 9-12) analysis of recruitment strategies in the IMF found a strong emphasis on elite institutional education and competence in a dominant macroeconomic paradigm. The result was an overwhelmingly high proportion of male staff with doctoral degrees from North American universities. No staff members were trained outside an industrialized country. Internal and external critics refer to the hiring strategy as "intellectual monocropping" (Evans and Finnemore 2001, 9-12) and a "cloning syndrome" (Michael Camdessus, quoted in Momani [2007] , 51). IMF staff themselves recognize the extent and consequences of homogeneity. Some complain that innovation, flexibility, and risk-taking are discouraged; others describe the culture as technical, economistic, homogeneous, and conforming (IMF 1999, 32; IEO 2006, 49; Momani 2007, 46-51) . This manifests in a "textbook" (Momani 2007, 46) approach to policymaking that does not sufficiently take into consideration the political context in which they will implement these policies. Cognitive biases also played a part in the IMF's failure to anticipate the 2008 global financial crisis. A study by the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO 2011, 1) pointed to "groupthink" and a "lack of incentives to . . . raise contrarian views." They observed a prevailing view among staff that "market discipline and self-regulation would be sufficient to stave off serious problems" (IEO 2011, 7) . Injecting diverse wisdom into international bureaucracies requires modifying the incentive structures that promote candor or silence (IEO 2011, 1) , as well as deliberate recruitment strategies. In the IMF, Momani (2007) recommends recruiting more staff from the South; mid-career officials with policy experience and alternative organizational cultures; and social science graduates (52-53).
There are multiple avenues for enhancing cognitive diversity in global institutions. Epistemic democratization is a slow and piecemeal process that we can advance by diversifying global governors in multiple settings. This section focused on state-based processes and institutions, but private governance networks and exclusive minilateral clubs are also susceptible to intellectual capture and insularity (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 82-119) . Internal diversification strategies may improve the cognitive diversity of global institutions, but epistemic democratization of global governance also requires attention to the external environment of global institutions. Truly diversifying the pool of ideas and knowledge to which "global governors" are exposed is most likely to require better engagement with heterogeneous civil society. I examine the quality of existing engagement in the following section.
C) Maximizing Public Opportunities for Sharing Objective and Subjective Knowledge
The right decisions would likely emerge when inclusivity, diversity, and competence are maximized in global decision-making. Right decisions are those that most effectively resolve problems with the fewest unintended negative consequences. Anticipating potential problems and crafting alternative responses requires pooling experiences, insights, and objective and subjective knowledge. Civil society organizations can help tap into such diverse wisdom. Civil society is defined as the voluntary associations that form a part of society distinct from states and markets: NGOs, trade unions, religious groups, professional and business associations, media, and social movements (Edwards 2009, 20) . In practice, the spheres of state, market, and civil society are often blurred, but civil society should be concerned with shaping rules for social life without aspiring to "public office or pecuniary gain" (Scholte 2004, 214) . 13 In the case of business, we must "distinguish between profit-seeking activities by individual enterprises and the civic or political role of business associations" (Edwards 2009, 29) . The former is excluded from civil society, but the latter is included.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw international organizations open up to CSOs (Tallberg and Uhlin 2012) . Analysis of civil society participation in thirty-two European and global institutions shows that almost all institutions involve consultation; half operate a scheme for selecting and accrediting civil society organizations to allow them access to certain meetings (usually with the right to speak and distribute materials), and over half have arrangements for outreach and liaison meetings (Steffek and Nanz 2008, 19-21) . Recent analysis confirmed a general trend toward more openness over the past sixty years, and particularly after 1990 (Tallberg et al. 2013, 67) . To some degree, this opening is in response to legitimacy demands of civil society and stronger democratic norms within states. But it probably owes more to the perceived functional benefits of involving transnational non-state actors, such as tapping into expertise and services (Tallberg et al. 2013, 67) .
Although international organizations are opening up, concerns remain about the quality and impact of civil society inclusion. Generally, civil society is consulted at the policy formation stage, excluded from decision-making, and included again in policy implementation (Tallberg et al. 2013, 67, 217) . From an epistemic-democratic perspective, this staggered participation is not necessarily 13 Scholars observe that proximity to the state or market can moderate the critique of CSOs. The uniquely critical and independent perspective that CSOs can provide is thus endangered if too many CSOs collaborate with state or market actors (Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). problematic-provided that the shared perspectives are reflected upon and taken into account during decisionmaking. Problems arise when only certain voices are heard, and when consultation is not meaningfully connected to decision-making.
An effect of massive global inequalities is that many voices are not heard inside political institutions. Studies on environmental and trade negotiations confirm that access to international organizations is largely reserved for wellresourced civil society organizations from the North (Piewitt 2010, 480; Urhe 2013, 9; Hanegraaff et al. 2015) . But this does not reveal the full extent of dominance and exclusion. Inequalities also have societal and sectoral dimensions, affecting which voices are heard. Highton (2009 Highton ( , 1564 argues that knowledge is a resource whose distribution is skewed toward white, well-educated, and financially secure men. Wealthy and highly educated citizens in the North and South are more aware of the profiles and activities of international bodies like the UN Security Council (Dellmuth Forthcoming) . This knowledge advantage is often coupled with a resource advantage that allows these groups to seize opportunities for participation. Unsurprisingly, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (for example women, poor, and non-white people) are less likely to engage with international political processes (Uhre 2013, 128, 148) . The epistemic quality of decision-making is undermined to the extent that their perspectives are unexpressed in deliberations leading to decisions.
It is also widely observed that among non-state actors, business interests enjoy relatively privileged access to global institutions. But the pattern of dominance is nuanced. Business dominance is more pronounced in trade negotiations than environmental ones. In climate change and biodiversity institutions, environmental civil society organizations have secured stronger or more balanced representation (Uhre 2013, 155) . The strength of business interests in civil society masks its own inequalities: business associations in the South are limited or weak, and are far less likely to participate in global institutions than other advocacy groups (Piewitt 2010) ; while in the North, small businesses, cooperatives, and social enterprises are far weaker in their political representation than large corporations.
Even if we could eliminate inequalities, we would still face logistical challenges of tapping into the knowledge of large numbers of widely dispersed people. Universal direct participation is impossible. Opportunities for sharing knowledge need to be structured in ways that better connect broader publics with a more limited number of actors who have direct institutional access. Decisions taken in international institutions can have impacts at local and national levels that neither decision-makers nor affected people anticipate. Engaged civil society organizations have a role to play in bridging this epistemic and spatial divide by promoting and informing public debate at local and national levels and transmitting knowledge and experience from these levels to global institutions. More heads are better than one, but we can only apply this edict in the global context if we think creatively about how to apply the minds of the many to distant decisions.
International efforts to control disease epidemics illustrate the importance of connective broader publics to decision-making institutions. Dominant modes of epidemic governance emphasize certain framings of the problem and privilege certain forms of knowledge. This has the effect of excluding a variety of other epidemic "narratives," which in turn can undermine efforts to control disease outbreaks Dry and Leach 2010) . Leach et al. (2010, 372) show that the dominant narrative within international agencies interprets disease dynamics in terms of "sudden emergence, speedy, farreaching, often global spread," and favors a response of "universalised, generic emergency oriented control, at source, aimed at eradication." This framing privileges formal science and epidemiology to define and solve the problem. Outbreaks of Ebola in Africa are interpreted through this narrative, which focuses international cooperation on urgent responses at the point of outbreak (for example the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, and Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network). Outbreaks in Congo have been securitized, with neighboring countries closing borders and placing police and military on high alert. Alternative narratives on Ebola exist among NGOs and local communities and may lead to alternative-and potentially more effective-responses. These include a development-oriented narrative stressing "the structural causes of inequity and disease vulnerability amongst particular populations. . .and address[ing] the long-term implications" (Leach et al. 2010, 372) . This draws attention, for example, to the relationship between deforestation and vulnerability to hemorrhagic fevers (through closer contact with forest animal reservoirs). A local narrative interprets Ebola as endemic and emphasizes the various control and response mechanisms that have existed for years and can be integrated into larger-scale international responses (Leach et al. 2010, 372) . Civil society organizations with access to international institutions have a role to play in communicating with national and local citizen groups to promote debate or tap into existing debates and practices at national and local levels. This is required to ensure that they are cognizant of alternative narratives and knowledge claims. These debates and practices may occur with some degree of ignorance of global processes and narratives. Hence, the transmission of knowledge and ideas is a two-way process between the local/national level and the global level.
A remaining challenge for epistemic democratization is to make public access politically consequential. We should not applaud expanded opportunities for sharing knowledge if these have no impact on decisions. Cases of inconsequential or purely symbolic civil society engagement could probably be documented across all global issues. The World Trade Organization's engagement structures are illustrative. In response to civil society protests, the WTO has sought to make its processes more transparent and facilitate more public access. Civil society is still banned from negotiating sessions, and while they can observe plenary sessions, they cannot make oral or written submissions. Opportunities for sharing knowledge are largely limited to pre-conference dialogues between WTO committee staff and civil society. These serve to "elicit views from NGOs" (Williams 2011, 116-17) but are largely divorced from decision processes. At best they are ineffective, at worst merely tokenistic. Inconsequential public engagement is yet one more sign of the epistemicdemocratic deficit of global governance.
Conclusion
A growing body of literature at the intersection of International Relations and democratic theory sensitizes us to moral reasons for taking global democracy seriously. It argues that, if people are affected by supranational decisions, then they deserve the opportunity to interact with or influence those decision-making processes. This provides a persuasive, but incomplete, justification for enhancing participation in global governance. In this article, I sought to bolster the case for global democracy by developing an instrumentalist justification for maximizing inclusivity and diversity in global governance. The complexity and scale of problems facing the international community strain the capacity of states and global institutions to effectively respond. Of course, democracy should not be reserved only for particularly challenging and complex problems. It is in such contexts that the perils of groupthink and exclusion become particularly apparent.
It has become a cliché to say that global problems require global solutions. But for too long this statement has simply underscored the importance of states cooperating through multilateral institutions. Impatient with the pace of multilateral negotiations, some call for a shift to small minilateral institutions (Na ım 2009). Others look to governance networks of businesses, states, and occasionally non-governmental organizations (Hoffman 2011) . But effective global governance is unlikely to emerge from these institutions unless they are able to better harness diverse knowledge and judgments that lie beyond them. Global democracy scholars and activists must devise and demand processes and mechanisms that better connect global governors with the wisdom of the many. This article provided a justification for taking this agenda forward, and a framework for identifying epistemic deficits in existing global governance. Drawing on historical and contemporary debates about epistemic democracy, I distilled three principles that constitute an epistemic-democratic framework for evaluating global governance. These principles are not inextricable parts of a single democratizing process. They may prove mutually reinforcing, but progress on any one principle is not a precondition for progress on any other.
14 The epistemic quality of global governance may gradually improve by enhancing performance on any of these principles. Democratization is always a slow process, and we should expect piecemeal progress.
In advancing this research agenda, scholars should aim to pool wisdom from diverse subdisciplines in political science and law. Moral concerns about the democratic deficit of global governance already capture the attention of scholars of international relations and international law. Taking seriously debates in political theory about the epistemic qualities of democracy could deepen and strengthen existing arguments for inclusion, participation, transparency, and accountability at the global level. By engaging with analysts of global decision-making, political theorists in turn can advance and extend their arguments about core aspects of epistemic democracy, including the nature and significance of competence, diversity, and truth, and the scope conditions of epistemic democracy.
I propose three directions for future research on global epistemic democracy. First, to apply the epistemic democratic framework outlined above to comprehensively evaluate different domains of global governance, such as health, migration, security, and others. This will build on the exploratory evaluation presented here, and confirm the nature and extent of the epistemic-democratic deficit in global governance. Such research should also broaden our understanding of theoretically ideal and politically possible institutional reforms. 15 Second, understanding the options for global epistemic democratization requires assessment of the mechanisms for pooling knowledge and aggregating judgments at the global level. Different global political institutions use different forms of voting and deliberation to promote debate and make decisions. Knowledge of the epistemic merits of such procedures at the global level remains limited. Various procedures are also currently used to tap into knowledge outside decision-making settings (such as stakeholder consultations, global citizen forums, and Track 2 diplomacy). Assessing how well these perform-in terms of inclusiveness and promoting two-way knowledge transmission-will help identify promising options for global epistemic democratization.
Third, we need to recognize the factors that undermine epistemic-democratic principles. Deeper analysis of existing democratic deficits could yield insight into the power relations and incentive structures that promote conformity with dominant discourses. It will also point to other factors that limit diversity and promote homogeneity in global institutions. Documenting cases of inconsequential inclusion of non-state actors would allow for carefully targeted and specified critiques of the democratic deficits in global governance. Drawing lessons from cases of meaningful inclusion would also help identify the most effective institutional mechanisms (and conducive political conditions) for transmitting dispersed and diverse knowledge to decision-making settings.
As political authority diffuses beyond the nation-state, it is appropriate that democratic aspirations are also stretched to the global level. This matters for ensuring legitimate and effective rule. By maximizing inclusion and diversity, global democracy can produce better outcomes than other systems of rule. The rule of the many is ultimately superior to the rule of one or rule of the few. This is just as true for global governance as it is for the nationstate.
